Submitted by brad on Sat, 2016-02-13 15:31.
Last year, I wrote a few posts on the attack on Science Fiction’s Hugo awards, concluding in the end that only human defence can counter human attack. A large fraction of the SF community felt that one could design an algorithm to reduce the effect of collusion, which in 2015 dominated the nomination system. (It probably will dominate it again in 2016.) The system proposed, known as “e Pluribus Hugo” attempted to defeat collusion (or “slates”) by giving each nomination entry less weight when a nomination ballot was doing very well and getting several of its choices onto the final ballot. More details can be found on the blog where the proposal was worked out.
The process passed the first round of approval, but does not come into effect unless it is ratified at the 2016 meeting and then it applies to the 2017 nominations. As such, the 2016 awards will be as vulnerable to the slates as before, however, there are vastly more slate nominators this year — presuming all those who joined in last year to support the slates continue to do so.
Recently, my colleague Bruce Schneier was given the opportunity to run the new system on the nomination data from 2015. The final results of that test are not yet published, but a summary was reported today in File 770 and the results are very poor. This is, sadly, what I predicted when I did my own modelling. In my models, I considered some simple strategies a clever slate might apply, but it turns out that these strategies may have been naturally present in the 2015 nominations, and as predicted, the “EPH” system only marginally improved the results. The slates still massively dominated the final ballots, though they no longer swept all 5 slots. I consider the slates taking 3 or 4 slots, with only 1 or 2 non-slate nominees making the cut to be a failure almost as bad as the sweeps that did happen. In fact, I consider even nomination through collusion to be a failure, though there are obviously degrees of failure. As I predicted, a slate of the size seen in the final Hugo results of 2015 should be able to obtain between 3 and 4 of the 5 slots in most cases. The new test suggests they could do this even with a much smaller slate group as they had in the 2015 nominations.
Another proposal — that there be only 4 nominations on each nominating ballot but 6 nominees on the final ballot — improves this. If the slates can take only 3, then this means 3 non-slate nominees probably make the ballot.
An alternative - Make Room, Make Room!
First, let me say I am not a fan of algorithmic fixes to this problem. Changing the rules — which takes 2 years — can only “fight the last war.” You can create a defence against slates, but it may not work against modifications of the slate approach, or other attacks not yet invented.
Nonetheless, it is possible to improve the algorithmic approach to attain the real goal, which is to restore the award as closely as possible to what it was when people nominated independently. To allow the voters to see the top 5 “natural” nominees, and award the best one the Hugo award, if it is worth.
The approach is as follows: When slate voting is present, automatically increase the number of nominees so that 5 non-slate candidates are also on the ballot along with the slates.
To do this, you need a formula which estimates if a winning candidate is probably present due to slate voting. The formula does not have to be simple, and it is OK if it occasionally identifies a non-slate candidate as being from a slate.
- Calculate the top 5 nominees by the traditional “approval” style ballot.
- If 2 or more pass the “slate test” which tries to measure if they appear disproportionately together on too many ballots, then increase the number of nominees until 5 entries do not meet the slate condition.
As a result, if there is a slate of 5, you may see the total pool of nominees increased to 10. If there are no slates, there would be only 5 nominees. (Ties for last place, as always, could increase the number slightly.)
Let’s consider the advantages of this approach:
- While ideally it’s simple, the slate test formula does not need to be understood by the typical voter or nominator. All they need to know is that the nominees listed are the top nominees.
- Likewise, there is no strategy in nominating. Your ballot is not reduced in strength if it has multiple winners. It’s pure approval.
- If a candidate is falsely identified as passing the slate test — for example a lot of Doctor Who fans all nominate the same episodes — the worst thing that happens is we get a few extra nominees we should not have gotten. Not ideal, but pretty tame as a failure mode.
- Likewise, for those promoting slates, they can’t claim their nominations are denied to them by a cabal or conspiracy.
- All the nominees who would have been nominated in the absence of slate efforts get nominated; nobody’s work is displaced.
- Fans can decide for themselves how they want to consider the larger pool of nominees. Based on 2015’s final results (with many “No Awards”) it appears fans wish to judge some works as there unfairly and discount them. Fans who wish it would have the option of deciding for themselves which nominees are important, and acting as though those are all that was on the ballot.
- If it is effective, it gives the slates so little that many of them are likely to just give up. It will be much harder to convince large numbers of supporters to spend money to become members of conventions just so a few writers can get ignored Hugo nominations with asterisks beside them.
It has a few downsides, and a vulnerability.
- The increase in the number of nominees (only while under slate attack) will frustrate some, particularly those who feel a duty to read all works before voting.
- All the slate candidates get on the ballot, along with all the natural ones. The first is annoying, but it’s hardly a downside compared to having some of the natural ones not make it. A variant could block any work that fits the slate test but scored below 5th, but that introduces a slight (and probably un-needed) bit of bias.
- You need a bigger area for nominees at the ceremony, and a bigger party, if they want to show up and be sneered at. The meaning of “Hugo Nominee” is diminished (but not as much as it’s been diminished by recent events.)
- As an algorithmic approach it is still vulnerable to some attacks (one detailed below) as well as new attacks not yet thought of.
- In particular, if slates are fully coordinated and can distribute their strength, it is necessary to combine this with an EPH style algorithm or they can put 10 or more slate candidates on the ballot.
All algorithmic approaches are vulnerable to a difficult but possible attack by slates. If the slate knows its strength and knows the likely range of the top “natural” nominees, it can in theory choose a number of slots it can safety win, and name only that many choices, and divide them up among supporters. Instead of having 240 people cast ballots with the 3 choices, they can have 3 groups of 80 cast ballots for one choice only. No simple algorithm can detect that or respond to it, including this one. This is a more difficult attack than the current slates can carry off, as they are not that unified. However, if you raise the bar, they may rise to it as well.
All algorithmic approaches are also vulnerable to a less ambitious colluding group, that simply wants to get one work on the ballot by acting together. That can be done with a small group, and no algorithm can stop it. This displaces a natural candidate and wins a nomination, but probably not the award. Scientologists were accused of doing this for L. Ron Hubbard’s work in the past.
The best way to work out the formula would be through study of real data with and without slates. One candidate would be to take all nominees present on more than 5% of ballots, and pairwise compare them to find out what fraction of the time the pair are found together on ballots. Then detect pairs which are together a great deal more than that. How much more would be learned from analysis of real data. Of course, the slates will know the formula, so it must be difficult to defeat it even knowing it. As noted, false positives are not a serious problem if they are uncommon. False negatives are worse, but still better than alternatives.
So what else?
At the core is the idea of providing voters with information on who the natural nominees would have been, and allowing them to use the STV voting system of the final ballot to enact their will. This was done in 2015, but simply to give No Award in many of the categories — it was necessary to destroy the award in order to save it.
As such, I believe there is a reason why every other system (including the WSFS site selection) uses a democratic process, such as write-in, to deal with problems in nominations. Democratic approaches use human judgment, and as such they are not a response to slates, but to any attack.
As such, I believe a better system is to publish a longer list of nominees — 10 or more — but to publish them sorted according to how many nominations they got. This allows voters to decide what they think the “real top 5” was and to vote on that if they desire. Because a slate can’t act in secret, this is robust against slates and even against the “slate of one” described above. Revealing the sort order is a slight compromise, but a far lesser one than accepting that most natural nominees are pushed off the ballot.
The advantages of this approach:
- It is not simply a defence against slates, it is a defence against any effort to corrupt the nominations, as long as it is detected and fans believe it.
- It requires no algorithms or judgment by officials. It is entirely democratic.
- It is completely fair to all comers, even the slate members.
The downsides are:
- As above, there are a lot more nominees, so the meaning of being a nominee changes
- Some fans will feel bound to read/examine more than 5 nominees, which produces extra work on their part
- The extra information (sorting order) was never revealed before, and may have subtle effects on voting strategy. So far, this appears to be pretty minor, but it’s untested. With STV voting, there is about as little strategy as can be. Some voters might be very slightly more likely to rank a work that sorted low in first place, to bump its chances, but really, they should not do that unless they truly want it to win — in which case it is always right to rank it first.
- It may need to add EPH style counting if slates get a high level of coordination.
Another surprisingly strong approach would be simply to add a rule saying, “The Hugo Administrators should increase the number of nominees in any category if their considered analysis leaves them convinced that some nominees made the final ballot through means other than the nominations of fans acting independently, adding one slot for each work judged to fail that test, but adding no more than 6 slots.” This has tended to be less popular, in spite of its simplicity and flexibility - it even deals with single-candidate campaigns — because some fans have an intense aversion to any use of human judgment by the Hugo administrators.
- Very simple (for voters at least)
- Very robust against any attempt to corrupt the nominations that the admins can detect. So robust that it makes it not worth trying to corrupt the nominations, since that often costs money.
- Does not require constant changes to the WSFS constitution to adapt to new strategies, nor give new strategies a 2 year “free shot” before the rules change.
- If administrators act incorrectly, the worst they do is just briefly increase the number of nominees in some categories.
- If there are no people trying to corrupt the system in a way admins can see, we get the original system we had before, in all its glory and flaws.
- The admins get access to data which can’t be released to the public to make their evaluations, so they can be smarter about it.
- Clearly a burden for the administrators to do a good job and act fairly
- People will criticise and second guess. It may be a good idea to have a post-event release of any methodology so people learn what to do and not do.
- There is the risk of admins acting improperly. This is already present of course, but traditionally they have wanted to exercise very little judgment.
Submitted by brad on Fri, 2015-07-10 12:02.
Facebook’s ARPU (average revenue per user, annualized) in the last quarter was just under $10, declining slightly in the USA and Canada, and a much lower 80 cents in the rest of the world. This is quite a bit less than Google’s which hovers well over $40.
That number has been mostly growing (it shrank last quarter for the first time) but it’s fairly low. I can solidly say I would happily pay $10 a year — even $50 a year — for a Facebook which was not simply advertising-free, but more importantly motivated only to please its customers and not advertisers. Why can’t I get that?
One reason is that it’s not that simple. If Facebook had to actually charge, it would not get nearly as many users as it does being free and ad-supported. It is frictionless to join and participate in FB, and that’s important with the natural monopolies that apply to social media. You dare not do anything that would scare away users.
Valley of Distraction
Being advertising supported bends how Facebook operates, as it will any company. The most obvious thing is the annoying ads. Particularly annoying are the ads which show up in my feed, often marked with “Friend X liked this company.” I am starting to warn my friends to please not like the pages of anybody who buys ads on FB, because these ads are even more distracting than regular ads. Also extra distracting are ads which are “just off the bulls-eye,” which is to say they are directed at me (based on what FB knows about me) and thus likely to distract me, but which turn out to be completely useless. That’s worse than an ad which was not well aimed and so doesn’t distract me at all with its uselessness. There is a “valley of distraction” when it comes to targeting ads:
- Ads about things I am researching or may want to buy can be actually valuable to me, and also rewarding to the advertiser.
- Ads about things I am interested in, but have already bought or would not buy via an ad are highly distracting but provide no value to the advertiser and negative value to me.
- Ads about things I have no interest in tend to be only mildly distracting if they are off to the side and not blinky/flashy/pop-up style.
As sites get better at ad targeting, they generate more of the middle type.
Facebook’s need to monetize with advertising gives them strong incentives to be less protective of privacy. All social networks have an anti-privacy incentive, because the more they can get you to share with more people, the more they can make things happen on their site, and the more they can attract in other users. But advertising ads to this. Without ads, FB would focus only on attracting and retaining customers by serving them, which would be good for users.
As the old saying goes, “If you’re not paying, you’re not the customer, you’re the product.” To give credit to many web companies, in spite of the reality of this, they actually work hard to reduce the truth of this statement, but they can never do it entirely.
How we monetize the web
When I created the first internet based publication in 1989, I did it by selling subscriptions. There really wasn’t a way to do it with advertising at that time, but I lamented the eventual switch that later came which has made advertising the overwhelmingly dominant means of monetizing the web. There are a few for-pay sites but they are very few and specialized. I lament that forces pushed the web that way, and have always wished for a mechanism to make it easier, if not as easy, to monetize a web site with payment from customers. That’s why I promoted ideas like microrefunds as well as selling books in flat-rate pools like my Library of Tomorrow back in 1992. (Fortunately this concept is now starting to get some traction in some areas, like Amazon’s Kindle Unlimited.)
I’m also very interested in the way that low-friction digital currencies like Bitcoin and in particular Dogecoin have made it work workable to give donations and tips. Dogecoin started as a joke, but because people viewed it as a joke, they were willing to build easy and low security means of tipping people. The lack of value attached to Dogecoin meant people were more willing to play around with such approaches. Perhaps Bitcoin’s greatest flaw is that because its transactions are irrevocable, you must make the engine that spends them secure, and in turn, that demands it is harder to use. Easy to spend means easy to lose, or easy to steal and that’s a rule that’s hard to break. The credit card system, in order to be easy to spend, solves the problem of being easy to steal by allowing chargebacks or other human fixes when problems occur. While we can do better at making digital money easy to spend and not quite so easy to steal, it’s hard to figure out how to be perfect at that without something akin to chargebacks.
To monetize the web without advertising, we need a truly frictionless money. Advertising provides a money whose only friction is the annoyance of the advertising. To consume an ad-supported product you need do nothing but waste a little time. It’s a fairly passive thing. To consume a consumer-paid product, you must pay, and that creates three frictions:
- The spending itself — though if it’s low that should be tolerable
- The mental cost of thinking about the spending — which often exceeds the monetary cost on tiny transactions
- The user interface cost of your means of payment.
You can’t eliminate #1 of course, but you can realize that the monetary cost is less than the negatives introduced by advertising. Eliminating #2 and #3 in a secure way is the challenge, and indeed it is the challenge which I devised the microrefund concept to address.
Will we pay the cost?
I think lots of people would pay $10/year for Facebook, particularly if alternatives also charged money. It’s a bargain at that price. But would people pay the $50 that Google makes from them? Again, I think Google is a bargain at that price, but for a lot of the world, that could be a lot of money, and that’s Google’s average revenue, not its revenue for me. (I click on ads so rarely that I think their revenue from me is actually a lot lower.)
|I already bought my ticket on Iberia!|
At the same time, Google’s ads are among the least painful. The ads on search are marked and isolated, and largely text based. The only really bad ads Google is doing are the ones in the valley of distraction in Adsense. As I wrote earlier, we are all constantly seeing ads for things we already bought.
And so, even though a Google search might only cost you a couple of pennies, I doubt we could move Google to payment supported even if we could remove all the friction from it.
This is not true for many other sites, though. Video sites would be a great target for frictionless payment, since showing a 30 second video ad to watch a 2 minute video is a terrible bargain, yet we see it happen frequently. There are many sites who do much worse than Google at monetizing themselves through advertising, and who would welcome a way to get more decent revenues via payment — though of course they can’t get greedy or they friction of the payment itself will reduce their business.
In addition, there are zillions of small sites and sites about topics of no commercial value who can’t make much money from advertising at all. Some of these sites probably don’t even exist because they can’t become going concerns in the current regime of monetizing the web — what fraction of the web are we missing because we have only one practical way to monetize it?
Submitted by brad on Fri, 2015-06-12 08:18.
I want to begin a series of thoughts on how E-mail has failed us and what we should do about it.
Yes, E-mail has failed, and not, as we thought, because it got overwhelmed with spam. There is tons of spam but we seem to be handling it. The problem might be better described as “too much signal” rather than the signal/noise ratio. There are three linked problems:
- There is just too much E-mail from people we actually have relationships with. Part of this is the over-reach of businesses, who think that because you bought a tube of toothpaste that you should fill out a customer satisfaction survey and get the weekly bargains mail-out, but part of it is there really are a lot of people who want to interact with you, and e-mail makes it very easy for them to do that, particularly to “cc” you on mail you may only have a marginal interest.
- Because of problem 1, people are moving away from E-mail to other tools, particularly the younger generation. They (and we) are using Facebook mail and other social tools, instant messengers, texting and more.
- The volume means that you can’t handle it all. Important mails scroll off the main screen and are forgotten about. And some people are just not using their E-mail, so it is losing its place as the one universal and reliable way to send somebody a message.
One of the key differences the new media have is they focus on person to person communications — while there are group tools, they don’t even have the concept of a “cc” or mailing list, or even sending to two people.
I’m going to write more on these topics in the future, but today I want to talk about
The shared calendar as the communications tool
I’ve been pushing people I work with to use the calendar as the means of telling me about anything that is going to happen at a specific time. If people send me an E-mail saying, “Can we talk at 3?” I say, “don’t tell me that in an E-mail. Create an event on your calendar and invite me to it. Put the details of the conversation into the calendar entry.”
In general, I want to create a pattern of communication where if any message you send would cause the other person to put something on their calendar, you instead communicate it through the calendar by creating an event that they are an attendee of.
Our calendar and E-mail tools need to improve to make this work better. When everybody uses a shared calendar like Google Calendar, it is a lot easier, but we need tools that make it just as easy when people don’t use the same calendar tool.
When things do get into the calendar, you get a lot of nice benefits:
- You are much less likely to forget about or miss the task or event
- When you want to find the data on the event near the time of the event, you don’t have to hunt around for it — it is highlighted, in my case right on the home screen of my phone
- If the event has a location, your phone typically is able to generate a map and even warn you when you need to leave based on traffic
- If the event has a phone call/hangout/whatever, your devices can join that with a single click, no hunting for URLs or meeting codes — particularly while driving. (Google put in a tool to add one of their hangouts to any event in the calendar.)
- Calendar events remove any confusion on time zones when people are in different zones.
Here are some features I want, some of which exist in current tools (particularly if you attach an ICS calendar entry to an E-mail) but which don’t yet work seamlessly.
- Your email tool, when writing a message should notice if you’re talking about an event that’s not already in your calendars, and parse out dates and other data and turn it into a calendar invitation
- Likewise your receiving tool should parse messages and figure this out, since the sender might not have done that.
- E-mails that create calendar events should be linked together, so that from your calendar you can read all the email threads around the event, find any associated files or other resources.
- Likewise it should be easy to contact any others tied to a calendar event by any means, not just the planned means of communication. For example, a good calendar should have a system where I can be phoned or texted on my cell phone by any other member of the event during the time around the event, without having to reveal my cell phone number. How often have you been waiting for a conference call to have somebody say, “does anybody know John’s number? Let’s find where he is.”
- When I accept a calendar entry from outside and confirm, that should give them some access to use that calendar entry as a means of communication, even across calendar and mail platforms.
For example, when I book a flight or hotel or rent a car, the company should respond by putting that in my calendar. I might given them a token enabling that, or manually approve their invitation. Of course the confirmation numbers, links on how to change the reservation and more will be in the calendar entry. If the flight is delayed, they should be able to use this linkage to contact me — my calendar tool should know best where I am and the best ways to reach me — and push updates to me. When I get to the check-in desk, our shared calendar entry should make my phone and their computer immediately connect and make the process seamless.
When I approach the desk of a hotel, my phone should notice this, do the handshake and by the time I walk up they should say, “Good evening, Mr. Templeton, could you please sign this form? Here’s your room key, you’re in suite 1207.” (Of course, even better if I don’t have to sign the form and my phone, or any of the magstripe, chip or NFC cards I have in my wallet automatically become my room key.)
When you think this way, you start realizing that a surprisingly large amount of our E-mails are about events with times. And, as I wrote 8 years ago, most e-mails involve tasks, and E-mail and time management should be merged. Sadly my ideas of so long ago remain unrealized, and since then, E-mail has declined.
One caveat — if we do start using calendars for communication more, we must be able to prevent spam, and even over-use by people we know. We can’t do what we did with e-mail. Invitations to an event with just one or two people can be made easy — even automatic for those with authorization. Creating multi-person events needs to be a harder thing for people who aren’t whitelisted, though not impossible. The meaning of the word “invite” also needs to be more tightly understood. A solicitation for me to buy a ticket is not an invite.
Submitted by brad on Mon, 2015-04-13 19:54.
Last week’s Hugo Awards point of crisis caused a firestorm even outside the SF community. I felt it time to record some additional thoughts above the summary of many proposals I did.
It’s not about the politics
I think all sides have made an error by bringing the politics and personal faults of either side into the mix. Making it about the politics legitimises the underlying actions for some. As such, I want to remove that from the discussion as much as possible. That’s why in the prior post I proposed an alternate history.
What are the goals of the award?
Awards are funny beasts. They are almost all given out by societies. The Motion Picture Academy does the Oscars, and the Worldcons do the Hugos. The Hugos, though, are overtly a “fan” award (unlike the Nebulas which are a writer’s award, and the Oscars which are a Hollywood pro’s award.) They represent the view of fans who go to the Worldcons, but they have always been eager for more fans to join that community. But the award does not belong to the public, it belongs to that community.
While the award is done with voting and ballots, I believe it is really a measurement, which is to say, a survey. We want to measure the aggregate opinion of the community on what the best of the year was. The opinions are, of course, subjective, but the aggregate opinion is an objective fact, if we could learn it.
In particular, I would venture we wish to know which works would get the most support among fans, if the fans had the time to fairly judge all serious contenders. Of course, not everybody reads everything, and not everybody votes, so we can’t ever know that precisely, but if we did know it, it’s what we would want to give the award to.
To get closer to that, we use a 2 step process, beginning with a nomination ballot. Survey the community, and try to come up with a good estimate of the best contenders based on fan opinion. This both honours the nominees but more importantly it now gives the members the chance to more fully evaluate them and make a fair comparison. To help, in a process I began 22 years ago, the members get access to electronic versions of almost all the nominees, and a few months in which to evaluate them.
Then the final ballot is run, and if things have gone well, we’ve identified what truly is the best loved work of the informed and well-read fans. Understand again, the choices of the fans are opinions, but the result of the process is our best estimate of a fact — a fact about the opinions.
The process is designed to help obtain that winner, and there are several sub-goals
- The process should, of course, get as close to the truth as it can. In the end, the most people should feel it was the best choice.
- The process should be fair, and appear to be fair
- The process should be easy to participate in, administer and to understand
- The process should not encourage any member to not express their true opinion on their ballot. If they lie on their ballot, how can we know the true best aggregate of their opinions.
- As such, ballots should be generated independently, and there should be very little “strategy” to the system which encourages members to falsely represent their views to help one candidate over another.
- It should encourage participation, and the number of nominees has to be small enough that it’s reasonable for people to fairly evaluate them all
A tall order, when we add a new element — people willing to abuse the rules to alter the results away from the true opinion of the fans. In this case, we had this through collusion. Two related parties published “slates” — the analog of political parties — and their followers carried them out, voting for most or all of the slate instead of voting their own independent and true opinion.
This corrupts the system greatly because when everybody else nominates independently, their nominations are broadly distributed among a large number of potential candidates. A group that colludes and concentrates their choices will easily dominate, even if it’s a small minority of the community. A survey of opinion becomes completely invalid if the respondents collude or don’t express their true views. Done in this way, I would go so far as to describe it as cheating, even though it is done within the context of the rules.
Proposals that are robust against collusion
Collusion is actually fairly obvious if the group is of decent size. Their efforts stick out clearly in a sea of broadly distributed independent nominations. There are algorithms which make it less powerful. There are other algorithms that effectively promote ballot concentration even among independent nominators so that the collusion is less useful.
A wide variety have been discussed. Their broad approaches include:
- Systems that diminish the power of a nominating ballot as more of its choices are declared winners. Effectively, the more you get of what you asked for, the less likely you will get more of it. This mostly prevents a sweep of all nominations, and also increases diversity in the final result, even the true diversity of the independent nominators.
- Systems which attempt to “maximize happiness,” which is to say try to make the most people pleased with the ballot by adding up for each person the fraction of their choices that won and maximizing that. This requires that nominators not all nominate 5 items, and makes a ballot with just one nomination quite strong. Similar systems allow putting weight on nominations to make some stronger than others.
- Public voting, where people can see running tallies, and respond to collusion with their own counter-nominations.
- Reduction of the number of nominations for each member, to stop sweeps.
The proposals work to varying degrees, but they all significantly increase the “strategy” component for an individual voter. It becomes the norm that if you have just a little information about what the most common popular choices will be, that your wisest course to get the ballot you want will be to deliberately remove certain works from your ballot.
Some members would ignore this and nominate honestly. Many, however, would read articles about strategy, and either practice it or wonder if they were doing the right thing. In addition to debates about collusion, there would be debates on how strategy affected the ballot.
Certain variants of multi-candidate STV help against collusion and have less strategy, but most of the methods proposed have a lot.
In addition, all the systems permit at least one, and as many as 2 or 3 slate-choice nominees onto the final ballot. While members will probably know which ones those are, this is still not desired. First of all, these placements displace other works which would otherwise have made the ballot. You could increase the size of the final ballot, you need to know how many slate choices will be on it.
It should be clear, when others do not collude, slate collusion is very powerful. In many political systems, it is actually considered a great result if a party with 20% of the voters gains 20% of the “victories.” Here, we have a situation with 2,000 nominators, and where just 100 colluding members can saturate some categories and get several entries into all of them, and with 10% (the likely amount in 2015) they can get a large fraction of them. As such it is not proportional representation at all.
Fighting human attackers with human defence
Consideration of the risks of confusion and strategy with all these systems, I have been led to the conclusion that the only solid response to organized attackers on the nomination system is a system of human judgement. Instead of hard and fast voting rules, the time has come, regrettably, to have people judge if the system is under attack, and give them the power to fix it.
This is hardly anything new, it’s how almost all systems of governance work. It may be a hubris to suggest the award can get by without it. Like the good systems of governance this must be done with impartiality, transparency and accountability, but it must be done.
I see a few variants which could be used. Enforcement would most probably be done by the Hugo Committee, which is normally a special subcommittee of the group running the Worldcon. However, it need not be them, and could be a different subcommittee, or an elected body.
While some of the variants I describe below add complexity, it is not necessary to do them. One important thing about the the rule of justice is that you don’t have to get it exactly precise. You get it in broad strokes and you trust people. Sometimes it fails. Mostly it works, unless you bring in the wrong incentives.
As such, some of these proposals work by not changing almost anything about the “user experience” of the system. You can do this with people nominating and voting as they always did, and relying on human vigilance to deflect attacks. You can also use the humans for more than that.
A broad rule against collusion and other clear ethical violations
The rule could be as broad as to prohibit “any actions which clearly compromise the honesty and independence of ballots.” There would be some clarifications, to indicate this does not forbid ordinary lobbying and promotion, but does prohibit collusion, vote buying, paying for memberships which vote as you instruct and similar actions. The examples would not draw hard lines, but give guidance.
Explicit rules about specific acts
The rule could be much more explicit, with less discretion, with specific unethical acts. It turns out that collusion can be detected by the appearance of patterns in the ballots which are extremely unlikely to occur in a proper independent sample. You don’t even need to know who was involved or prove that anybody agreed to any particular conspiracy.
The big challenge with explicit rules (which take 2 years to change) is that clever human attackers can find holes, and exploit them, and you can’t fix it then, or in the next year.
Delegation of nominating power or judicial power to a sub group elected by the members
Judicial power to fix problems with a ballot could fall to a committee chosen by members. This group would be chosen by a well established voting system, similar to those discussed for the nomination. Here, proportional representation makes sense, so if a group is 10% of the members it should have 10% of this committee. It won’t do it much good, though, if the others all oppose them. Unlike books, the delegates would be human beings, able to learn and reason. With 2,000 members, and 50 members per delegate, there would be 40 on the judicial committee, and it could probably be trusted to act fairly with that many people. In addition, action could require some sort of supermajority. If a 2/3 supermajority were needed, attackers would need to be 1/3 of all members.
This council could perhaps be given only the power to add nominations — beyond the normal fixed count — and not to remove them. Thus if there are inappropriate nominations, they could only express their opinion on that, and leave it to the voters what to do with those candidates, including not reading them and not ranking them.
Instead of judicial power, it might be simpler to appoint pure nominating power to delegates. Collusion is useless here because in effect all members are now colluding about their different interests, but in an honest way. Unlike pure direct democracy, the delegates, not unlike an award jury, would be expected to listen to members (and even look at nominating ballots done by them) but charged with coming up with the best consensus on the goal stated above. Such jurors would not simply vote their preferences. They would swear to attempt to examine as many works as possible in their efforts. They would suggest works to others and expect them to be likely to look at them. They would expect to be heavily lobbied and promoted to, but as long as its pure speech (no bribes other than free books and perhaps some nice parties) they would be expected to not be fooled so easily by such efforts.
As above, a nominating body might also only start with a member nominating system and add candidates to it and express rulings about why. In many awards, the primary function of the award jury is not to bypass the membership ballot, but to add one or two works that were obscure and the members may have missed. This is not a bad function, so long as the “real ballot” (the one you feel a duty to evaluate) is not too large.
Transparency and accountability
There is one barrier to transparency, in that releasing preliminary results biases the electorate in the final ballot, which would remain a direct survey of members with no intermediaries — though still the potential to look for attacks and corruption. There could also be auditors, who are barred from voting in the awards and are allowed to see all that goes on. Auditors might be people from the prior worldcon or some other different source, or fans chosen at random.
Finally, decisions could be appealed to the business meeting. This requires a business meeting after the Hugos. Attackers would probably always appeal any ruling against them. Appeals can’t alter nominations, obviously, or restore candidates who were eliminated.
All the above requires the two year ratification process and could not come into effect (mostly) until 2017. To deal with the current cheating and the promised cheating in 2016, the following are recommended.
- Downplay the 2015 Hugo Award, perhaps with sufficient fans supporting this that all categories (including untainted ones) have no award given.
- Conduct a parallel award under a new system, and fête it like the Hugos, though they would not use that name.
- Pass new proposed rules including a special rule for 2016
- If 2016’s award is also compromised, do the same. However, at the 2016 business meeting, ratify a short-term amendment proposed in 2015 declaring the alternate awards to be the Hugo awards if run under the new rules, and discarding the uncounted results of the 2016 Hugos conducted under the old system. Another amendment would permit winners of the 2015 alternate award to say they are Hugo winners.
- If the attackers gave up, and 2016’s awards run normally, do not ratify the emergency plan, and instead ratify the new system that is robust against attack for use in 2017.
Submitted by brad on Sun, 2015-04-05 23:48.
Since 1992 I have had a long association with the Hugo Awards for SF & Fantasy given by the World Science Fiction Society/Convention. In 1993 I published the Hugo and Nebula Anthology which was for some time the largest anthology of current fiction every published, and one of the earliest major e-book projects. While I did it as a commercial venture, in the years to come it became the norm for the award organizers to publish an electronic anthology of willing nominees for free to the voters.
This year, things are highly controversial, because a group of fans/editors/writers calling themselves the “Sad Puppies,” had great success with a campaign to dominate the nominations for the awards. They published a slate of recommended nominations and a sufficient number of people sent in nominating ballots with that slate so that it dominated most of the award categories. Some categories are entirely the slate, only one was not affected.
It’s important to understand the nominating and voting on the Hugos is done by members of the World SF Society, which is to say people who attend the World SF Convention (Worldcon) or who purchase special “supporting” memberships which don’t let you go but give you voting rights. This is a self-selected group, but in spite of that, it has mostly manged to run a reasonably independent vote to select the greatest works of the year. The group is not large, and in many categories, it can take only a score or two of nominations to make the ballot, and victory margins are often small. As such, it’s always been possible, and not even particularly hard, to subvert the process with any concerted effort. It’s even possible to do it with money, because you can just buy memberships which can nominate or vote, so long as a real unique person is behind each ballot.
The nominating group is self-selected, but it’s mostly a group that joins because they care about SF and its fandom, and as such, this keeps the award voting more independent than you would expect for a self-selected group. But this has changed.
The reasoning behind the Sad Puppy effort is complex and there is much contentious debate you can find on the web, and I’m about to get into some inside baseball, so if you don’t care about the Hugos, or the social dynamics of awards and conventions, you may want to skip this post. read more »
Submitted by brad on Tue, 2015-02-03 21:29.
Bitcoin’s been on a long decline over the past year, and today is around $220 per coin. The value has always been based on speculation about Bitcoin’s future value, not its present value, so it’s been very hard to predict and investment in the coins has been risky.
Some thinking led me to a scary conclusion. Recent news has revealed that a number of “cloud mining” companies have shut down after the price drop. Let me explain why.
Over time, all bitcoin mining has been done using specialized ASIC hardware. The hardware is priced so that you can make a decent but not ridiculous profit with it. All the bitcoins mined go mostly into paying for mining hardware and electricity — much less goes into profit for the miners. In the past, the electricity was the big cost, but mining hardware got fast enough and expensive enough that most of the cost of mining has been paying off your mining hardware, with electricity dropping to being 20% or less of the cost.
In other words, most of the 3600 btc/day mining revenues of the bitcoin system have been going into the people making mining chips and rigs, but that’s another story.
With the drop in price, electricity is back up to being half your cost. That puts a squeeze on the cost of mining equipment. With cloud mining, as with Amazon Web Services, you rented mining equipment and power by the hour. People who bought their mining equipment will still run it as long as the revenue is more than the operating cost. For cloud mining, you need the revenue to exceed the operating and capital cost, because the capital costs are amortized into the operating cost. While cloud mining companies could cut their fees to cut their losses, some have instead just left the business.
As noted, those who bought mining equipment are running it now at less profit, but as long as the mining brings in more than the electricity cost, it’s still worth running — the mining gear is all paid for, and even though you will never make back your money, it’s worse if you shut it off.
You can get a good analysis of the cost and profitability of mining rigs at this mining calculator.
What if a panic dropped a bitcoin under $100?
It’s not out of the question that a sudden panic might drop Bitcoin quickly down to $100. It probably won’t happen, but it certainly could. At this point, with current generation mining equipment, most miners then see their revenue drop below the cost of electricity. If they are rational and strictly profit-oriented, they cry into their beer and turn off the mining rig. And the cloud miners have already done that, and some other miners have done the same sooner than they expected, and the network hashrate (the measure of how much mining power there is) has had minor sustained drops for the first time in years.
(It’s worst than this. Even at $150, all but the most recent mining rigs become unprofitable to keep turned on, and so a major drop would happen with much less of a drop needed. New mining equipment expected to ship in the next few months is profitable at even lower prices, though.)
The way Bitcoin works, when they turn off the rig, it doesn’t mean more coins for the other miners. Bitcoin sets the reward rate with a “difficulty” number that makes the Bitcoin lottery problem harder the more mining capacity is out there. Your reward rate is a strict function of the difficulty and the power of your miners.
Every 2016 blocks, the difficulty adjusts based on how much capacity seems to be mining. Under normal operations, 2016 blocks is two weeks, as long as people are mining at the rate seen in the 2 weeks prior to setting the current difficulty. If large volumes of miners shut off their rigs as non-productive, the mining rate would crash. The wait for a new difficulty could be not just two weeks if this happened at the wrong time, but 4 weeks if half the miners shut down, or 8 weeks if 3/4 of them left. In terms of the Bitcoin world, it’s effectively forever, and long before that, confidence in the coin price would probably drop further, causing more miners to shut off their rigs. Only dedicated fans willing to lose money to preserve the system would keep mining.
In such a panic, the Bitcoin Foundation and others might propose an emergency modification of the Bitcoin software base which is able to do an emergency reduction of the difficulty number. Alternately they could propose bumping the mining reward back to 50 coins instead of 25. This would still take days, which I think is too long. But if they did, it’s a sticky issue. As soon as you drop the difficulty enough, all those miners come back online, and now the difficulty is too low. To do it right, an estimate would have to be made of how much mining capacity is cost effective and set the difficulty so that only some of the miners come back online, a number tied to that difficulty. For example, one might look at the various mining rigs out there, and set the difficulty such that they are (barely) profitable while others are not. Problem is, the profitability depends on the price of a bitcoin, which will be wildly fluctuating. It’s not clear how to solve this.
If the electricity cost exceeds the reward, but you still want bitcoins for future investment, the rational thing is not to mine, but to just buy bitcoins on the exchanges and keep the price up.
What would happen after such a collapse? Could it be stopped?
The collapse would probably spread to altcoins, but some might survive and become successors to Bitcoin. In addition, there are many people devoted to Bitcoin who would continue to mine, even at a loss, to get it back on its feet. After all, the early years of Bitcoin, all mining was at a loss, though it turned into a huge bonanza later and was a wise idea in hindsight. With the large number of well funded companies in the space, we could see companies willing to maintain unprofitable mining for some time if the alternative is the destruction of the thing they’ve based their business on. They might even buy up the rigs of failed miners, or pay them to mine. Perhaps, if they are ready, they could heed the warning in this message and make contracts with enough miners to say, “we’ll pay you to keep mining if a collapse happens.”
Alternately, Bitcoin users and boosters could just start deliberately leaving large transaction fees in their transactions to make the cost of mining worthwhile again. While hard to sustain long term, it is in their interest to spend their bitcoins to keep the mining system going, since those coins probably drop immensely if it falls down. It also keeps faith in the mining system since if the coin owners ran the miners, they might corrupt the network with that much power. It should be noted that it’s always been part of the plan for Bitcoin that higher transaction fees would arise as the coinbase rewards dropped, but not this early, and because the reward dropped in btc, not dollars.
The subsidy would have to be enough to overcome losses and provide a modest or even very small profit. The network cost pays 3600 bitcoins/day in mining fees (or $360K at $100/bitcoin.) The subsidy might be more in the range of $50K or $100K per day — affordable to keep the network alive for up to 14 days to survival.
Another idea would be to develop a way to make the difficulty more dynamic, or provide some mechanism for an emergency reduction. (An emergency increase would mean something was really wrong and would probably also mean somebody had more than half the mining capacity, another must-not-happen.)
What sort of events could cause such a huge drop, to 45% of the current value? That’s not been seen in a short time, but a big political event, such as a suggestion the USA or EU might forbid or impede Bitcoin could do it. But there are many other things that can cause panic. A shutdown of exchanges (a common technique in stock market panics) would probably do little, as there are exchanges all over the world and all will not shut down. A call to miners to sacrifice might work, at least for a while, to allow time to fix the problem.
Latent mining capacity
Mining rigs are shut down all the time as non-profitable, but in the past that’s always been because newer, better rigs were out there dominating the mining space and pushing up the difficulty. It would be a new idea to have rigs shut down because the dollar price dropped. When such rigs shut down, they would not be permanently useless, and unless torn down, they would be able to restart at any time. For example, if the difficulty dropped (because they all shut down) they would all start running again, and blocks would come out faster than intended. Then, 2016 blocks later, the difficulty would be recalculated up again — and they would stop again. Miners would also start and stop based on the day’s price as well, and the price might even swing around the expected rises and drops in difficulty. This seems like it would be chaos.
Once the electricity cost dominates, the important metric in mining equipment is not gigahashes/second, but gigahashes per joule. At 10 cents/kwh, you need around 2 gigahashes/joule to beat the electricity cost with $100 bitcoins and today’s difficulty number. At today’s $220 bitcoins, 0.9 gigahash/joule will do. Most miners are under 2, but there are some that do close to 3, and there is the promise of 5. If the trends in the rest of computing are an indicator, operations per joule will eventually level off, even as transistor counts continue to increase. If that happens we will stop seeing big increases in mining power and the upward spiral would end.
Submitted by brad on Tue, 2015-02-03 17:29.
After yesterday’s story about Uber and CMU, a lot of speculation has flown that Uber will now be at odds with Google, both about building robocars and also on providing network taxi service, since another rumour said Google plans to launch an Uber like “ride share” service.
Since then, the Uber blog post and this interview with Uber folks tell a slightly different story. Uber is funding a research center at CMU, and giving lots of grants to academics. Details are not fully available, but typically this means being at an early research stage. With these research labs, academics are keen to publish all they do, so little gets done in secret. In many cases the sponsor gets a licence to the technology but it’s often not exclusive. If Uber wanted to build their own car, chances are they would do it in a more private lab.
Rumours that David Drummond would resign from the Uber board also have not panned out. Google has invested hugely in Uber (already for good return at the present valuation) and Google Maps offers you an Uber if you ask it for directions somewhere — it’s actually one of the easier interfaces for ordering one.
Rumours around Google’s efforts suggest that Big G has been testing a “ride share” app with employees and plans to launch it. Google has denied that, and says it loves Uber and Lyft. Further news revealed the rumours were about an internal carpooling system, not involving the self-driving cars. I could imagine confusion because Uber and others call themselves “ride sharing” which is a bit of a fabrication to not look like a taxi, while a carpooling app would be real ride sharing. (UberPool is real ride sharing.) Google, which has a terrible undersupply of parking is very keen on getting employees to ride its bus system and to carpool.
That said, Google has talked about the same thing I talk about — the true goal of robocar technology being the creation of a mobility on demand taxi service, like Uber but at a much lower cost. Google has not said that they would provide that themselves, or who they would partner with if they did it. Most people have presumed it might be Uber but I don’t think that’s at all assured.
At the same time, Uber has assured its drivers they are not going away for the foreseeable future. I suspect that’s an equivocation, and just means that we can’t see very far in the future right now!
Submitted by brad on Mon, 2015-02-02 20:31.
I commonly see statements from connected car advocates that vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure communications are an important, even essential technology for robocar development. Readers of this blog will know I disagree strongly, and while I think I2V will be important (done primarily over the existing mobile data network) I suspect that V2V is only barely useful, with minimal value cases that have a hard time justifying its cost.
Of late, though, my forecast for V2V grows even more dismal, because I wonder if robocars will implement V2V with human-driven cars at all, even if it becomes common for ordinary cars to have the technology because of a legal mandate.
The problem is security. A robocar is a very dangerous machine. Compromised, it can cause a lot of damage, even death. As such, security will have a very strong focus in development. You don’t want anybody breaking into the computer systems or your car or anybody else’s. You really don’t want it.
One clear fact that people in security know — a very large fraction of computer security breaches caused by software faults have come from programs that receive input data from external sources, in particular when you will accept data from anybody. Internet tools are the biggest culprits, and there is a long history of buffer overflows, injection attacks and other trouble that has fallen on tools which will accept a message from just anyone. Servers (which openly accept messages from outside) are at the greatest risk, but even client tools like web browsers run into trouble because they go to vast numbers of different web sites, and it’s not hard to trick people to sending them to a random web site.
We work very hard to remove these vulnerabilities, because when you’re writing a web tool, you have no choice. You must accept input from random strangers. Holes still get found, and we pay the price.
The simplest strategy to improve your chances is to go deaf. Don’t receive inputs from outside at all. You can’t do that in most products, but if you can close off a channel without impeding functionality it’s a good approach. Generally you will do the following to be more secure:
- Be a client, which means you make communications requests, you do not receive them.
- You only connect to places you trust. You avoid allowing yourself to be directed to connect to other things
- You use digital signature and encryption to assure that you really are talking to your trusted server.
This doesn’t protect you perfectly. Your home server can be compromised — it often will be running in an environment not as locked down as this. In fact, if it becomes your relay for messages from outside, as it must, it has a vector for attack. Still, the extra layer adds some security. read more »
Submitted by brad on Mon, 2015-02-02 14:42.
Rumours reported in TechCrunch suggest Uber is opening a robocar lab in Pittsburgh and hiring up to 50 CMU folks to staff it.
Update: On the Uber blog we now see it’s more funding of research labs at CMU, on many topics
That’s a major step, if true. People have often pointed out how well Uber is poised to make use of robocar technology to bring computer summoned taxi service to the next level. If Uber did not exist, I would surely be building it to get that advantage. Many have assumed that since Google is a major investment partner in Uber that they would partner on this technology, but this suggests otherwise.
I write about Uber a lot here not just because of interest in what they do today, but because it teaches us a lot about how people will view Robocars in the future. Uber’s interface is very similar to what you might see for a robocar service, and the experience is fairly similar, just much more expensive. UberX is $1.30/mile plus 26 cents/minute with $2.20 flag drop. The Black service is $3.75/mile and 65 cents/minute with an $8 flag drop. I expect robocar tax service to be cheaper than 50 cents/mile with minimal per-minute charges. The flag drop is not yet easy to calculate. What richer people do with Uber teaches us what the whole public will do with robocars.
Uber lets you say where you are going but doesn’t demand it. That’s one thing I suspect will be different with your robotaxi, because it’s really nice if they can send you a vehicle chosen for the trip you have in mind. Ie. a small, efficient car without much range for short, single person trips. Robotaxi services will offer you the ability to not say your destination — but they will probably charge more for it, and that means most people will be willing to say their destination.
Uber does not hide their desire to get rid of all their drivers, which sounds like a strange strategy, but the truth is that cab driving is not something most people view as a career. It’s a quick source of money with no special skills, something people do until something better comes along, or in the gaps in their day to make extra cash. Unlike people losing jobs to robots on a factory line, nobody is particularly upset at the idea.
Submitted by brad on Thu, 2014-12-04 09:12.
In August, I attended the World Science Fiction Convention (WorldCon) in London. I did it while in Coeur D’Alene, Idaho by means of a remote Telepresence Robot(*). The WorldCon is half conference, half party, and I was fully involved — telepresent there for around 10 hours a day for 3 days, attending sessions, asking questions, going to parties. Back in Idaho I was speaking at a local robotics conference, but I also attended a meeting back at the office using an identical device while I was there.
After doing this, I have written up a detailed account of what it’s like to attend a conference and social event using these devices, how fun it is now, and what it means for the future.
You can read Attending the World Science Fiction convention on the other side of the world by remote telepresence robot
For those of you in the TL;DR crowd, the upshot is that it works. No, it’s not as good as being there in person. But it is a substantial fraction of the way there, and it’s going to get better. I truly feel I attended that convention, but I didn’t have spend the money and time required to travel to London, and I was able to do other things in Idaho and California at the same time.
When you see at new technology that seems not quite there yet, you have to decide — is this going to get better and explode, or is it going to fizzle. I’m voting for the improvement argument. It won’t replace being there all of the time, but it will replace being there some of the time, and thus have big effects on travel — particularly air travel — and socialization. There are also interesting consequences
for the disabled, for the use of remote labour and many other things.
(*)As the maker will point out, this is not technically a robot, just a remote controlled machine. Robots have sensors and make some of their own decisions on how they move.
Submitted by brad on Thu, 2014-08-07 18:49.
Last month I wrote about paradoxes involving bitcoin and other cryptocurrency mining. In particular, I pointed out that while many people are designing alternative coins so that they are hard to mine with ASICs — and thus can be more democratically mined by people’s ordinary computers or GPUs — this generates a problem. If mining is done on ordinary computers, it becomes worthwhile to break into ordinary computers and steal their resources for mining. This has been happening, even with low powered NAS box computers which nobody would ever bother to mine on if they had to pay for the computer and its electricity. The attacker pays nothing, so any mining capacity is good.
Almost any. In Bitcoin, ASIC mining is so productive that it’s largely a waste of time to mine with ordinary CPUs even if you get them for free, since there is always some minor risk in stealing computer time. While ordinary computers are very hard to secure, dedicated ASIC mining rigs are very simple special purpose computers, and you can probably secure them.
But in a recently revealed attack thieves stole bitcoins from miners by attacking not the ASIC mining rigs, but their internet connections. The rigs may be simple, but the computers they flow their data through, and the big network routers, are less so. Using BGP redirection, it is suspected, the thieves just connected the mining rigs to a different mining pool than the one they thought they joined. And so they worked away, mining hard, and sometimes winning the bitcoin lottery, not for their chosen pool, but the thieves’ pool.
It’s not hard to imagine fixes for this particular attack. Pools and rigs can authenticate more strongly, and pools can also work to keep themselves more secure.
But we are shown one of the flaws of almost all digital money systems. If your computer can make serious money just by computing, or it can spend money on your behalf without need for a 2nd factor authentication, then it becomes very worthwhile for people to compromise your system and steal your computer time or your digital money. Bitcoin makes this even worse by making transactions irrevocable and anonymous. For many uses, those are features, but they are also bugs.
For the spending half, there is much effort in the community to build more secure wallets that can’t just spend your money if somebody takes over your computer. They rely on using multiple keys, and keeping at least one key in a more secure, even offline computer. Doing this is very hard, or rather doing it with a pleasant and happy user interface is super hard. If you’re going to compete with PayPal it’s a challenge. If somebody breaks into my PayPal account and transfers away the money there, I can go to PayPal and they can reverse those transactions, possibly even help track down the thieves. It’s bad news if a merchant was scammed but very good news for me.
One could design alternate currencies with chargebacks or refundability, but Bitcoin is quite deliberate in its choice not to have those. It was designed to be like cash. The issue is that while you could probably get away keeping your cash in your mattress and keeping a secure house, this is a world where somebody can build robots that can go into all the houses it can find and pull the cash out of the mattresses without anybody seeing.
Submitted by brad on Sat, 2014-06-28 10:47.
Everybody knows about bitcoin, but fewer know what goes on under the hood. Bitcoin provides the world a trustable ledger for transactions without trusting any given party such as a bank or government. Everybody can agree with what’s in the ledger and what order it was put there, and that makes it possible to write transfers of title to property — in particular the virtual property called bitcoins — into the ledger and thus have a money system.
Satoshi’s great invention was a way to build this trust in a decentralized way. Because there are rewards, many people would like to be the next person to write a block of transactions to the ledger. The Bitcoin system assures that the next person to do it is chosen at random. Because the winner is chosen at random from a large pool, it becomes very difficult to corrupt the ledger. You would need 6 people, chosen at random from a large group, to all be part of your conspiracy. That’s next to impossible unless your conspiracy is so large that half the participants are in it.
How do you win this lottery to be the next randomly chosen ledger author? You need to burn computer time working on a math problem. The more computer time you burn, the more likely it is you will hit the answer. The first person to hit the answer is the next winner. This is known as “proof of work.” Technically, it isn’t proof of work, because you can, in theory, hit the answer on your first attempt, and be the winner with no work at all, but in practice, and in aggregate, this won’t happen. In effect, it’s “proof of luck,” but the more computing you throw at the problem, the more chances of winning you have. Luck is, after all, an imaginary construct.
Because those who win are rewarded with freshly minted “mined” bitcoins and transaction fees, people are ready to burn expensive computer time to make it happen. And in turn, they assure the randomness and thus keep the system going and make it trustable.
Very smart, but also very wasteful. All this computer time is burned to no other purpose. It does no useful work — and there is debate about whether it inherently can’t do useful work — and so a lot of money is spent on these lottery tickets. At first, existing computers were used, and the main cost was electricity. Over time, special purpose computers (dedicated processors or ASICs) became the only effective tools for the mining problem, and now the cost of these special processors is the main cost, and electricity the secondary one.
Money doesn’t grow on trees or in ASIC farms. The cost of mining is carried by the system. Miners get coins and will eventually sell them, wanting fiat dollars or goods and affecting the price. Markets, being what they are, over time bring closer and closer the cost of being a bitcoin miner and the reward. If the reward gets too much above the cost, people will invest in mining equipment until it normalizes. The miners get real, but not extravagant profits. (Early miners got extravagant profits not because of mining but because of the appreciation of their coins.)
What this means is that the cost of operating Bitcoin is mostly going to the companies selling ASICs, and to a lesser extent the power companies. Bitcoin has made a funnel of money — about $2M a day — that mostly goes to people making chips that do absolutely nothing and fuel is burned to calculate nothing. Yes, the miners are providing the backbone of Bitcoin, which I am not calling nothing, but they could do this with any fair, non-centralized lottery whether it burned CPU or not. If we can think of one.
(I will note that some point out that the existing fiat money system also comes with a high cost, in printing and minting and management. However, this is not a makework cost, and even if Bitcoin is already more efficient doesn’t mean there should not be effort to make it even better.)
Naturally, many people have been bothered by this for various reasons. A large fraction of the “alt” coins differ from Bitcoin primarily in the mining system. The first round of coins, such as Litecoin and Dogecoin, use a proof-of-work system which was much more difficult to solve with an ASIC. The theory was that this would make mining more democratic — people could do it with their own computers, buying off-the-shelf equipment. This has run into several major problems:
- Even if you did it with your own computer, you tended to need to dedicate that computer to mining in the end if you wanted to compete
- Because people already owned hardware, electricity became a much bigger cost component, and that waste of energy is even more troublesome than ASIC buying
- Over time, mining for these coins moved to high-end GPU cards. This, in turn caused mining to be the main driver of demand for these GPUs, drying up the supply and jacking up the prices. In effect, the high end GPU cards became like the ASICs — specialized hardware being bought just for mining.
- In 2014, vendors began advertising ASICs for these “ASIC proof” algorithms.
- When mining can be done on ordinary computers, it creates a strong incentive for thieves to steal computer time from insecure computers (ie. all computers) in order to mine. Several instances of this have already become famous.
The last point is challenging. It’s almost impossible to fix. If mining can be done on ordinary computers, then they will get botted. In this case a thief will even mine at a rate that can’t pay for the electricity, because the thief is stealing your electricity too. read more »
Submitted by brad on Fri, 2014-03-21 12:39.
Bitcoin is hot-hot-hot, but today I want to talk about how it ends. Earlier, I predicted a variety of possible fates for Bitcoin ranging from taking over the entire M1 money supply to complete collapse, but the most probable one, in my view, is that Bitcoin is eventually supplanted by one or more successor digital currencies which win in the marketplace. I think that successor will also itself be supplanted, and that this might continue for some time. I want to talk about not just why that might happen, but also how it may take place.
Nobody thinks Bitcoin is perfect, and no digital currency (DigiC) is likely to satisfy everybody. Some of the flaws are seen as flaws by most people, but many of its facets are seen as features by some, and flaws by others. The anonymity of addresses, the public nature of the transactions, the irrevocable transactions, the fixed supply, the mining system, the resistance to control by governments — there are parties that love these and hate these.
Bitcoin’s most remarkable achievement, so far, is the demonstration that a digital currency with no intrinsic value or backer/market maker can work and get a serious valuation. Bitcoin argues — and for now demonstrates — that you can have a money that people will accept only because they know they can get others to accept it with no reliance on a government’s credit or the useful physical properties of a metal. The price of a bitcoin today is pretty clearly the result of speculative bubble investment, but that it sustains a price at all is a revelation.
Bitcoins have their value because they are scarce. That scarcity is written into the code — in the regulated speed of mining, and in the fixed limit on coins. There will only be so many bitcoins, and this gives you confidence in their value, unlike say, Zimbabwe 100 trillion dollar notes. This fixed limit is often criticised because it will be strongly deflationary over time, and some more traditional economic theory feels there are serious problems with a deflationary currency. People resist spending it because holding it is better than spending it, among other things.
While bitcoins have this scarcity, digital currencies as a group do not. You can always create another digital currency. And many people have. While Bitcoin is the largest, there are many “altcoins,” a few of which (such as Ripple, Litecoin and even the satirical currency Dogecoin) have serious total market capitalizations of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars(1). Some of these altcoins are simply Bitcoin or minor modifications of the Bitcoin protocol with a different blockchain or group of participants, others have more serious differences, such as alternate forms of mining. Ripple is considerably different. New Altcoins will emerge from time to time, presumably forever.
What makes one digital coin better than another? Obviously a crucial element is who will accept the coin in exchange for goods, services or other types of currency. The leading coin (Bitcoin) is accepted at more stores which gives it a competitive advantage.
If one is using digital currency simply as a medium — changing dollars to bitcoins to immediately buy something with bitcoins at a store, then it doesn’t matter a great deal which DigiC you use, or what its price is, as long as it is not extremely volatile. (You may be interested in other attributes, like speed of transaction and revocation, along with security, ease of use and other factors.) If you wish to hold the DigC you care about appreciation, inflation and deflation, as well as the risk of collapse. These factors are affected as well by the “cost” of the DigiC.
The cost of a digital currency
I will advance that every currency has a cost which affects its value. For fiat currency like dollars, all new dollars go to the government, and every newly printed dollar devalues all the other dollars, and overprinting creates clear inflation. read more »
Submitted by brad on Sun, 2014-03-09 13:25.
The latest Bitcoin bombshell — distracting us even from the Mt.Gox failure — was the Newsweek cover story — their first printed issue since 2012 — declaring they had found the mythical creator of Bitcoin, known under the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto, and he was a guy from near L.A. in his 60s whose real birth name was actually Satoshi Nakamoto.
Now known as Dorian S. Nakamoto, I’ll refer to him as DSN to distinguish him from BCSN — the Bitcoin creator Satoshi Nakamoto, though of course the question is whether DSN == BCSN. DSN denies he is BCSN and says his quotes suggesting that were answers to other questions, at least in his mind.
The second surprise was a web posting from BCSN, the first in years, simply saying he is not DSN. This posting is confusing, because a little thought shows it reveals no information on that subject. If DSN is BCSN, then of course both are denying it. More to the point, BCSN is clearly somebody well versed in game theory and trust calculus, and knows very well that the denial does not add reliable information on this.
BCSN’s post does tell us one big thing though — that BCSN is still alive, around, and even willing to comment if the issue is as big as this one. Many speculated that his silence meant he was gone, and also that he had lost his estimated million bitcoins.
The Bitcoin community was quite skeptical of the Newsweek claim. One very justified reason for this skepticism is that aside from the two key disputed quotes, the article’s arguments that it has found BCSN read like nonsense to the average nerd.
DSN might be BCSN, the article reasons, because he is a nerdy engineer with good technical skills, a background working at various tech companies and government projects, is aloof from his family and neighbours, and enjoys a technical hobby such as collecting model trains, even machining his own parts. “Smart, intelligent, mathematics, engineering, computers. You name it, he can do it,” says DSN’s brother. He’s a little bit libertarian, looks scruffy and is reportedly a bit of an asshole.
Aha, links Leah McGrath Goodman of Newsweek — this “suggested I was on the right track.”
What she doesn’t realize perhaps is that I literally know hundreds people who fit that description. It’s a profile that is actually more likely to be true than not among wide swaths of the nerd community.
Goodman’s logic reads to us like somebody saying, “I was on the track of the Zodiac killer, whom we know to be from San Francisco. I identified a suspect named John Zodiac who is a quiet loner, and is known to like the San Francisco Giants and burritos in the Mission district. I’m on the right track!”
There is only one thing in the Newsweek article that was worthy of attention. With police he summoned ready to usher Goodman away from his house, he tells her
“I am no longer involved in that and I cannot discuss it. It’s been turned over to other people. They are in charge of it now. I no longer have any connection.”
In the context of Bitcoin, that’s indeed proof enough. The police officers present have confirmed he did say something like this. DSN insists he felt he was being asked about his past classified work on government projects. He says he had not even heard about Bitcoin until this matter came up.
Various online forces have come up with other arguments against the match. DSN’s known writings seem fairly different from the writings of BCSN, though Goodman finds a few commonalities, including hints that BCSN is perhaps older (like DSN.)
But most of all, BCSN is known as a scrupulous protector of his or her or their own identity. BCSN made meticulous use of online identity hiding techniques to avoid being tracked, and has never spent any of the huge cache of bitcoins mined in the early days, possibly to avoid the risk of detection. This is so completely at odds with the idea of doing it all under his real name that after a perfunctory search in the early days, most people who fancied themselves Satoshi-finding detectives rarely bothered to look at people whose real name was Satoshi Nakamoto. Common wisdom, in fact, was that he/she probably wasn’t even Japanese. Certainly not somebody with no history in the cryptography or digital money communities.
But what if it is him?
While currently the tide seems to be to discredit the Newsweek story, a second question has been raised — is it good or bad if BCSN is unmasked, and if it is this guy? read more »
Submitted by brad on Wed, 2014-03-05 14:58.
Yesterday, I wrote about stolen bitcoins and the issues around a database of stolen coins. The issue is very complex, so today I will add some follow-up issues.
When stolen property changes hands (innocently) the law says that nobody in the chain had authority to transfer title to that property. Let’s assume that the law accepts bitcoins as property, and bitcoin transactions as denoting transfer of title, (as well as possession/control) to it. So with a stolen bitcoin, the final recipient is required on the law to return possession of the coin to its rightful owner, the victim of the theft. However, that recipient is also now entitled to demand back whatever they paid for the bitcoin, and so on down the line, all the way to the thief. With anonymous transactions, that’s a tall order, though most real world transactions are not that anonymous.
This is complicated by the fact that almost all Bitcoin transactions mix coins together. A Bitcoin “wallet” doesn’t hold bitcoins, rather it holds addresses which were the outputs of earlier transactions, and those outputs were amounts of bitcoin. When you want to do a new transaction, you do two things:
- You gather together enough addresses in your wallet which hold outputs of prior transactions, which together add up to as much as you plan to spend, and almost always a bit more.
- You write a transaction that lists all those old outputs as “inputs” and then has a series of outputs, which are the addresses of the recipients of the transaction.
There are typically 3 (or more) outputs on a transaction:
- The person you’re paying. The output is set to be the amount you’re paying
- Yourself. The output is the “change” from the transaction since the inputs probably didn’t add up exactly to the amount you’re paying.
- Any amount left over — normally small and sometimes zero — which does not have a specific output, but is given as a transaction fee to the miner who put your transaction into the Bitcoin ledger (blockchain.)
They can be more complex, but the vast majority work like this. While normally you pay the “change” back to yourself, the address for the change can be any new random address, and nothing in the ledger connects it to you.
So as you can see, a transaction might combine a ton of inputs, some of which are clean, untainted coins, some of which are tainted, and some of which are mixed. After coins have been through a lot of transactions, the mix can be very complex. Not so complex as the computers can’t deal with it and calculate a precise fraction of the total coin that was tainted, but much too complex for humans to wish to worry about.
A thief will want to mix up their coins as quickly as possible, and there are a variety of ways to do that.
Right now, the people who bought coins at Mt.Gox (or those who sent them there to buy other currency) are the main victims of this heist. They thought they had a balance there, and its gone. Many of them bought these coins at lower prices, and so their loss is not nearly as high as the total suggests, but they are deservedly upset.
Unfortunately, if the law does right by them and recovers their stolen property, it is likely that might come from the whole Bitcoin owning and using community, because of the fact that everybody in the chain is liable. Of particular concern are the merchants who are taking bitcoin on their web sites. Let’s speculate on the typical path of a stolen coin that’s been around for a while:
- It left Mt.Gox for cash, sold by the thief, and a speculator simply held onto the coins. That’s the “easy” one, the person who now has stolen coins has to find the thief and get their money back. Not too likely, but legally clear.
- It left Mt.Gox and was used in a series of transactions, ending up with one where somebody bought an item from a web store using bitcoin.
- With almost all stores, the merchant system takes all bitcoin received and sells it for dollars that day. Somebody else — usually a bitcoin speculator — paid dollars for that bitcoin that day, and the chain continues.
There is the potential here for a lot of hassle. The store learns they sold partially tainted bitcoins. The speculator wants and is entitled to getting a portion of her money back, and the store is an easy target to go after. The store now has to go after their customer for the missing money. The store also probably knows who their customer is. The customer may have less knowledge of where her bitcoins came from.
This is a huge hassle for the store, and might very well lead to stores reversing their decisions to accept bitcoin. If 6% of all bitcoins are stolen, as the Mt.Gox heist alleges, most transactions are tainted. 6% is an amount worth recovering for many, and it’s probably all the profit at a typical web store. Worse, the number of stolen coins may be closer to 15% of all the circulating bitcoins, certainly something worth recovering on many transactions.
The “sinking taint” approach
Previously, I suggested a rule. The rule was that if a transaction merges various inputs which are variously reported as stolen (tainted) and not, then the total percentage be calculated, and the first outputs receive all the tainting, and the latter outputs (including the transaction fee, last of all) be marked clear. One of the outputs would remain partial unless the transaction was designed to avoid this. There is no inherent rule that the “change” comes last, it is just a custom, and it would probably be reversed, so that as much of the tainted fraction remains in the change as possible, and the paid amount is as clean as possible. Recipients would want to insist on that.
This allows the creation of a special transaction that people could do with themselves on discovering they have coin that is reported stolen. The transaction would split the coin precisely into one or more purely tainted outputs, and one or more fully clean outputs. Recipients would likely refuse bitcoin with any taint on it at all, and so holders of bitcoin would be forced to do these dividing transactions. (They might have to do them again if new theft reports come on coin that they own.) People would end up doing various combinations of these transactions to protect their privacy and not publicly correlate all their coin.
Tainted transaction fees?
The above system makes the transaction fee clean if any of the coin in the transaction is clean. If this is not done, miners might not accept such transactions. On the other hand, there is an argument that it would be good if miners refused even partially tainted transactions, other than the ones above used to divide the stolen coins from the clean. There would need to be a rule that allows a transaction to be declared a splitting transaction which pays its fees from the clean part. In this case, as soon as coins had any taint at all, they would become unspendable in the legit markets and it would be necessary to split them. They would still be spendable with people who did not accept this system, or in some underground markets, but they would probably convert to other currencies at a discount.
This works better if there is agreement on the database of tainted coins, but that’s unlikely. As such, miners would decide what databases to use. Anything in the database used by a significant portion of the miners would make those coins difficult to spend and thus prime for splitting. However, if they are clean in the view of a significant fraction of the miners, they will enter the blockchain eventually.
This is a lot of complexity, much more than anybody in the Bitcoin community wants. The issue is that if the law gets involved, there is a world of pain in store for the system, and merchants, if a large fraction of all circulating coins are reported as stolen in a police report, even a Japanese police report.
Submitted by brad on Tue, 2014-03-04 14:52.
Bitcoin has seen a lot of chaos in the last few months, including being banned in several countries, the fall of the Silk Road, and biggest of all, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which was for much of Bitcoin’s early history, the largest (and only major) exchange between regular currencies and bitcoins. Most early “investors” in bitcoin bought there, and if they didn’t move their coins out, they now greatly regret it.
I’ve been quite impressed by the ability of the bitcoin system to withstand these problems. Each has caused major “sell” days but it has bounced back each time. This is impressive because nothing underlies bitcoins other than the expectation that you will be able to use them into the future and that others will take them.
It is claimed (though doubted by some) that most of Mt.Gox’s bitcoins — 750,000 of them or over $400M — were stolen in some way, either through thieves exploiting a bug or some other means. If true, this is one of the largest heists in history. There are several other stories of theft out there as well. Because bitcoin transactions can’t be reversed, and there is no central organization to complain to, theft is a real issue for bitcoin. If you leave your bitcoin keys on your networked devices, and people get in, they can transfer all your coins away, and there is no recourse.
Or is there?
If you sell something and are paid in stolen money, there is bad news for you, the recipient of the money. If this is discovered, the original owner gets the money back. You are out of luck for having received stolen property. You might even be suspected of being involved, but even if you are entirely innocent, you still lose.
All bitcoin transactions are public, but the identities of the parties are obscured. If your bitcoins are stolen, you can stand up and declare they were stolen. More than that, unless the thief wiped all your backups, you can 99.9% prove that you were, at least in the past, the owner of the allegedly stolen coins. Should society accept bitcoins as money or property, you would be able to file a police report on the theft, and identify the exact coin fragments stolen, and prove they were yours, once. We would even know “where” they are today, or see every time they are spent and know who they went to, or rather, know the random number address that owns them now in the bitcoin system. You still own them, under the law, but in the system they are at some other address.
That random address is not inherently linked to this un-owner, but as the coins are spent and re-spent, they will probably find their way to a non-anonymous party, like a retailer, from whom you could claim them back. Retailers, exchanges and other legitimate parties would not want this, they don’t want to take stolen coins and lose their money. (Clever recipients generate a new address for every transaction, but others use publicly known addresses.)
Tainted coin database?
It’s possible, not even that difficult, to create a database of “tainted” coins. If such a database existed, people accepting coins could check if the source transaction coins are in that database. If there, they might reject the coins or even report the sender. I say “reject” because you normally don’t know what coins you are getting until the transaction is published, and if the other party publishes it, the coins are now yours. You can refuse to do your end of the transaction (ie. not hand over the purchased goods) or even publish a transaction “refunding” the coins back to the sender. It’s also possible to imagine that the miners could refuse to enter a transaction involving tainted coins into the blockchain. (For one thing, if the coins are stolen, they won’t get their transaction fees.) However, as long as some miner comes along willing to enter it, it will be recorded, though other miners could refuse to accept that block as legit. read more »
Submitted by brad on Mon, 2014-02-17 10:06.
It was revealed earlier this month that NHTSA wishes to mandate vehicle to vehicle radios in all cars. I have written extensively on the issues around this and regular readers will know I am a skeptic of this plan. This is not to say that I don’t think that V2V would not be useful for robocars and regular cars. Rather, I believe that its benefits are marginal when it comes to the real problems, and for the amount of money that must be spent, there are better ways to spend it. In addition, I think that similar technology can and will evolve organically, without a government mandate, or with a very minimal one. Indeed, I think that technology produced without a mandate or pre-set standards will actually be superior, cheaper and be deployed far more quickly than the proposed approach.
The new radio protocol, known as DSRC, is a point-to-point wifi style radio protocol for cars and roadside equipment. There are many applications. Some are “V2V” which means cars report what they are doing to other cars. This includes reporting one’s position tracklog and speed, as well as events like hitting the brakes or flashing a turn signal. Cars can use this to track where other cars are, and warn of potential collisions, even with cars you can’t see directly. Infrastructure can use it to measure traffic.
The second class of applications are “V2I” which means a car talks to the road. This can be used to know traffic light states and timings, get warnings of construction zones and hazards, implement tolling and congestion charging, and measure traffic.
This will be accomplished by installing a V2V module in every new car which includes the radio, a connection to car information and GPS data. This needs to be tamper-proof, sealed equipment and must have digital certificates to prove to other cars it is authentic and generated only by authorized equipment.
Robocars will of course use it. Any extra data is good, and the cost of integrating this into a robocar is comparatively small. The questions revolve around its use in ordinary cars. Robocars, however, can never rely on it. They must be be fully safe enough based on just their sensors, since you can’t expect every car, child or deer to have a transponder, ever.
One issue of concern is the timeline for this technology, which will look something like this:
- If they’re lucky, NHTSA will get this mandate in 2015, and stop the FCC from reclaiming the currently allocated spectrum.
- Car designers will start designing the tech into new models, however they will not ship until the 2019 or 2020 model years.
- By 2022, the 2015 designed technology will be seriously obsolete, and new standards will be written, which will ship in 2027.
- New cars will come equipped with the technology. About 12 million new cars are sold per year.
- By 2030, about half of all cars have the technology, and so it works in 25% of accidents. 3/4 of those will have the obsolete 2015 technology or need a field-upgrade. The rest will have soon to be obsolete 2022 technology. Most cars also have forward collision warning by this point, so V2V is only providing extra information in a tiny fraction of the 25% of accidents.
- By 2040 almost all cars have the technology, though most will have older versions. Still, 5-10% of cars do not have the technology unless a mandate demands retrofit. Some cars have the equipment but it is broken.
Because of the quadratic network effect, in 2030 when half of cars have the technology, only 25% of car interactions will be make use of it, since both cars must have it. (The number is, to be fair, somewhat higher as new cars drive more than old cars.) read more »
Submitted by brad on Fri, 2014-01-24 13:07.
I don’t know who the person or people are who, under the name Satoshi Nakamoto, created the Bitcoin system. The creator(s) want to keep their privacy, and given the ideology behind Bitcoin, that’s not too surprising.
There can only be 21 million bitcoins. It is commonly speculated that Satoshi did much of the early mining, and owns between 1 million and 1.5 million unspent bitcoins. Today, thanks in part to a speculative bubble, bitcoins are selling for $800, and have been north of $1,000. In other words, Satoshi has near a billion dollars worth of bitcoin. Many feel that this is not an unreasonable thing, that a great reward should go to Satoshi for creating such a useful system.
For Satoshi, the problem is that it’s very difficult to spend more than a small portion of this block, possibly ever. Bitcoin addresses are generally anonymous, but all transactions are public. Things are a bit different for the first million bitcoins, which went only to the earliest adopters. People know those addresses, and the ones that remain unspent are commonly believed to be Satoshi’s. If Satoshi starts spending them in any serious volume, it will be noticed and will be news.
The fate of Bitcoin
Whether Bitcoin becomes a stable currency in the future or not, today few would deny it is not stable, and undergoing speculative bubbles. Some think that because nothing backs the value of bitcoins, it will never become stable, but others are optimistic. Regardless of that, today the value of a bitcoin is fragile. The news that “Satoshi is selling his bitcoins!” would trigger panic selling, and that’s bad news in any bubble.
If Satoshi could sell, it is hard to work out exactly when the time to sell would be. Bitcoin has several possible long term fates:
- It could become the world’s dominant form of money. If it replaced all of the “M1” money supply in the world (cash and very liquid deposits) a bitcoin could be worth $1 million each!
- It could compete with other currencies (digital and fiat) for that role. If it captured 1% of world money supply, it might be $10,000 a coin. While there is a limit on the number of bitcoins, the limit on the number of cryptocurrencies is unknown, and as bitcoin prices and fees increase, competition is to be expected.
- It could be replaced by one or more successors of superior design, with some ability to exchange during a modest window, and then drifting down to minimal value
- It could collapse entirely and quickly in the face of government opposition, competition and other factors during its bubble phase.
My personal prediction is #3 — that several successor currencies will arise which fix issues with Bitcoin, with exchange possible for a while. However, just as bitcoins had their sudden rushes and bubbles, so will this exchange rate, and as momentum moves into this currency it could move very fast. Unlike exchanges that trade bitcoins for dollars, inter-cryptocurrency exchanges will be fast (though the settlement times of the currencies will slow things down.) It could be even worse if the word got out that “Satoshi is trading his coins for [Foo]Coin” as that could cause complete collapse of Bitcoin.
Perhaps he could move some coins through randomizing services that scramble the identity association, but moving the early coins to such a system would be seen as selling them. read more »
Submitted by brad on Mon, 2013-04-29 20:42.
I follow the Hugo awards closely, and 20 years ago published the 1993 Hugo and Nebula Anthology which was probably the largest anthology of currently released fiction ever published at the time.
The Hugo awards are voted by around 1,000 fans who attend the World SF Convention, so they have their biases, but over time almost all the greats have been recognized. In addition, until the year 2000, in the best novel Hugo, considered the most important, the winner was always science fiction, not fantasy even though both and more were eligible. That shifted, and from 2001 to 2012, there have been 6 Fantasy winners, one Alternate History, and 5+1 SF. (2010 featured a tie between bad-science SF in the Windup Girl and genre-bending political science fiction in The City & The City.)
That’s not the only change to concern me. A few times my own pick for the best has not even been nominated. While that obviously shows a shift between my taste and the rest of the fans, I think I can point to reasons why it’s not just that.
The 2013 nominees I find not particularly inspiring. And to me, that’s not a good sign. I believe that the Hugo award winning novel should say to history, “This is an example of the best that our era could produce.” If it’s not such an example, I think “No Award” should win. (No Award is a candidate on each ballot, but it never comes remotely close to winning, and hasn’t ever for novels. In the 70s, it deservedly won a few times for movies. SF movies in the mid and early 70s were largely dreck.)
What is great SF? I’ve written on it before, but here’s an improvement of my definition. Great SF should change how you see the future/science/technology. Indeed, perhaps all great literature should change how you view the thing that is the subject matter of the literature, be it love, suffering, politics or anything else. That’s one reason why I have the preference for SF over Fantasy in this award. Fantasy has a much harder time attaining that goal.
I should note that I consider these books below as worth reading. My criticism is around whether they meet the standard for greatness that a Hugo candidate should have.
2312 by Kim Stanley Robinson
This is the best of the bunch, and it does an interesting exploration into the relationship of human and AI, and as in all of Stan’s fiction, the environment. His rolling city on Mercury is a wonder. The setup is great but the pace is as glacial as the slowly rolling city and the result is good, but not at the level of greatness I require here. read more »
Submitted by brad on Sat, 2013-04-13 11:26.
Bitcoin is having its first “15 minutes” with the recent bubble and crash, but Bitcoin is pretty hard to understand, so I’ve produced this analogy to give people a deeper understanding of what’s going on.
It begins with a group of folks who take a different view on several attributes of conventional “fiat” money. It’s not backed by any physical commodity, just faith in the government and central bank which issues it. In fact, it’s really backed by the fact that other people believe it’s valuable, and you can trade reliably with them using it. You can’t go to the US treasury with your dollars and get very much directly, though you must pay your US tax bill with them. If a “fiat” currency faces trouble, you are depending on the strength of the backing government to do “stuff” to prevent that collapse. Central banks in turn get a lot of control over the currency, and in particular they can print more of it any time they think the market will stomach such printing — and sometimes even when it can’t — and they can regulate commerce and invade privacy on large transactions. Their ability to set interest rates and print more money is both a bug (that has sometimes caused horrible inflation) and a feature, as that inflation can be brought under control and deflation can be prevented.
The creators of Bitcoin wanted to build a system without many of these flaws of fiat money, without central control, without anybody who could control the currency or print it as they wish. They wanted an anonymous, privacy protecting currency. In addition, they knew an open digital currency would be very efficient, with transactions costing effectively nothing — which is a pretty big deal when you see Visa and Mastercard able to sustain taking 2% of transactions, and banks taking a smaller but still real cut.
With those goals in mind, they considered the fact that even the fiat currencies largely have value because everybody agrees they have value, and the value of the government backing is at the very least, debatable. They suggested that one might make a currency whose only value came from that group consensus and its useful technical features. That’s still a very debatable topic, but for now there are enough people willing to support it that the experiment is underway. Most are aware there is considerable risk.
Update: I’ve grown less fond of this analogy and am working up a superior one, closer to the reality but still easy to understand.
Bitcoins — the digital money that has value only because enough people agree it does — are themselves just very large special numbers. To explain this I am going to lay out an imperfect analogy using words and describe “wordcoin” as it might exist in the pre-computer era. The goal is to help the less technical understand some of the mechanisms of a digital crypto-based currency, and thus be better able to join the debate about them. read more »